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INTRODUCTION

Is Anthony M. Kennedy the consummate centrist on the
Rehnquist Court?
That cannot be, you say, because everybody knows that Sandra
Day O'Connor deserves the distinction.1 Justice O'Connor is the
exemplary practitioner of the style of judging that likely comes to
mind most often when Court watchers and constitutional law
cognoscenti allude to judicial centrism-what I will call here, with no
claim to originality and a standing reference to the work of Cass

* Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Thanks to Pam Brandwein, Marshall Dayan, Mark Graber, Ann Hubbard, Bill Marshall,
Richard Myers, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments, and to the participants and
attendees of the symposium Locating the Constitutional Center for a wide range of
questions and observations that have influenced many of the ideas at work in this paper.
1. See, e.g., Nancy Maveety, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Accommodationism and
Conservatism, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 114-15
(Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (discussing Justice O'Connor's behavioral and jurisprudential
accommodationism with a conservative cast; noting that "[s]he leans toward conservative
policy outcomes . .. but she does not derive the reasons or justifications for those
outcomes from conservative ideological or interpretive principles," instead adopting a
contextual accommodationist approach to judging) (emphasis omitted).
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Sunstein, "minimalist centrism."2 If minimalist centrism is what
centrism on the Supreme Court is all about, placing any other name
in nomination is an empty gesture indeed. Others on the Court do
minimalist centrism-Sunstein has said that Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer engage in versions of it from time to time 3 -but
no one does it more frequently and more notably than Justice
O'Connor.
What makes Justice Kennedy's case for recognition intriguing is
that it challenges us to acknowledge a different and bolder brand of
centrism that we overlook and by predisposition are resistant to
appreciate for its centrist qualities. In major cases raising questions of
liberty and freedom, Justice Kennedy practices and preaches what I
will be calling a "grand centrism"-a jurisprudence whose project is
the self-conscious maintenance of public faith in a substantive
constitutional center of clean, simple, shared American values. It is a
jurisprudence that holds that there are such shared American values,
that constitutional adjudication can be guided by them, and that the
Supreme Court must nurture them and keep them popularly
accessible, which means not only extolling them but ensuring that the
potentially distorting influences of legal doctrine and judicial restraint
are kept in check.
Justice Kennedy's case for recognition is made all the more
intriguing because grand centrism is only a part of his story. In the
other cases that have loomed most prominent on the Court's docket
during Justice Kennedy's tenure, those involving federalism and
national power, he engages in a different brand of centrism. There he
seeks a position that stands on principle but avoids the extremism
that besets competing frameworks for decision advanced by his
colleagues on the Court. It is a posture that some might see as
minimalist centrism of a piece with Justice O'Connor's, but it is
distinctive enough a variant to merit its own recognition. I will call it
"conceptual moderation." When grand centrism and conceptual
moderation are combined, they produce a distinctive centrist judicial
personam that taps multiple cultural and political veins to fortify its
centrist credentials.

2. For his works on the subject, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,

JUDICIAL MINIMALISM]; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1996).
3. See SUNSTEIN, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, supra note 2, at 9.
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MINIMALIST CENTRISM

Before turning to the specifics of Justice Kennedy's centrism, let
us first take quick stock of the kind of judicial behavior most often
recognized as centrist today. The philosopher Alasdair McIntyre had
Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Bakke4 decision in mind, but his
characterization captures the ethos of the minimalist centrism that has
achieved prominence in recent years.
"[O]ne function of the
Supreme Court must be to keep the peace between rival social groups
adhering to rival and incompatible principles of justice by displaying a
fairness which consists in even-handedness in its adjudications,"
McIntyre wrote.' To fulfill that function, the Court "play[s] the role
of a peacemaking or truce-keeping body by negotiating its way
through an impasse of conflict, not by invoking our shared moral first
principles. For our society as a whole has none."6
There you have the motivational wellspring of minimalist
centrism as currently ministered by its leading practitioner, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. For the minimalist centrist, many of the
defining cases of our times-cases about abortion, gay rights, and
affirmative action, for example-involve sharp, broad-based, and
seemingly intractable social conflict that the Supreme Court (and an
ideologically divided Supreme Court, no less) cannot hope to resolve
by appeal to a compelling, controlling principle. The strife is too
great, the principles too contestable and subsumable by the strife
itself. And so constitutional adjudication, much like diplomacy,
should set out to defuse the current skirmish on narrow terms that
offer a measure of assuagement to all sides and afford the Court
ample latitude to respond with similar inventiveness in future cases.
Insofar as its objective is the ascertainment of an accommodation
point somewhere between or amid the clashing social forces, the
approach projects an appreciable centrist quality. Its reliance on
narrow terms of resolution, both to facilitate short-term peace and to
preserve judicial options down the line, lends the approach its
minimalist cast.
The incidents of such a minimalist jurisprudence have been
extensively developed and defended by Cass Sunstein in his work on
incompletely theorized agreements and judicial minimalism.' Here I
merely wish to raise a contrasting backdrop to help highlight Justice
4.
5.
6.
7.

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 253 (2d ed. 1984).
Id.
See sources cited supra note 2.
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Kennedy's distinctive contributions to centrism, and so it suffices to
note four familiar features of minimalist centrism manifested in
Justice O'Connor's pivotal opinions for the Court. These four
features together make up the minimalist centrist's essential toolkit,
instruments that work together to ascertain the requisite
accommodation point and ensure the requisite minimalism. The first
feature is a close adherence to case-specific context that maximizes
the identification of points and considerations that may be employed
to construct a centrist and narrow resolution.8 The second is a
preference for temporalizing maneuvers that permit decisions on
socially controversial grounds to be deferred.9 The third is a
predilection for doctrinal innovations that make standards of review
more commodious, thereby facilitating more tightly contextual
accommodations and compromises. ° The fourth feature is a reliance
on rhetoric that presents the Court's decisions as moderate, centrist
outcomes that respect and give fair weight to all legitimate competing

interests, without undue favor to any side in the social conflict.1
No amount of praise for these features and their significant
accomplishments can ever refute the basic criticism that minimalist

centrism faces. As Charles Fried recently charged, minimalist
centrism in the fashion of Justice O'Connor produces a sense of
"doctrinal

drift"

and portends

"an

indefinite

and incoherent

prolongation of a fin-de-si~cle jurisprudence, where the court serves
8. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (upholding an affirmative
action admissions plan at a state-supported law school because, rather than employing a
quota system, the law school "engage[d] in a highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute
to a diverse educational environment").
9. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (preferring to invalidate the Texas anti-sodomy statute on equal protection
rather than substantive due process grounds and thereby deferring consideration of liberty
questions).
10. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (applying strict scrutiny standard that is not
"fatal-in-fact"); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 858-61
(1992) (rejecting the strict scrutiny standard for abortion regulation advanced in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and adopting the more flexible undue burden standard that
Justice O'Connor advanced in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989)). See generally Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002)
(detailing the Court's development of a new regime of judicial scrutiny that affords more
flexibility of response).
11. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-43 (portraying the Court's endorsement of
affirmative action in higher education as temporary and hence respectful of the interests
of critics); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating a state
affirmative action program designed to benefit minority contractors, but assuring states
that "[i]n the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be
necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion").

20051

GRAND CENTRISM

1357

as nothing more than an ad hoc arbiter of issues it finds too difficult
to decide in a principled way.' 1 2 As Sunstein has strived to
demonstrate, minimalist centrism can proceed toward principles that
in time might command broad allegiance as shared values. 13 But
those who expect their constitutional jurisprudence to proceed
forthrightly and confidently from such principles will not find
minimalist centrism suitable to their tastes.
II. SHARED VALUES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CENTER OF
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT

Minimalist centrism's uneasy relationship with the idea of shared
values merits further attention, for it is on precisely this point that
Justice Kennedy's brand of centrism distinguishes itself.
By McIntyre's account, minimalist centrism's relationship with
the idea of shared values is one of denial and resignation. The
finessing of conflict, rather than the invocation of shared first
principles, marks the centrist jurist's function because there are no
shared values to invoke: "[O]ur society as a whole has none."14 And
perhaps that is the case. Sanford Levinson raised the central
question-the pun is intended-in his meditation on the
Constitution's bicentennial, ConstitutionalFaith.5 Americans like to
regard their Constitution as the "central sacred text of our civil
religion," the repository of "shared values" to which we pledge a
"bonding commitment.- 16 But "[i]s it possible," Levinson asked,
"that the national covenant is without content, or is at least
unspecifiable?" 17 It was with no sense of joy that Levinson reported
his conclusion. The search for a constitutional center of substance-a
"propositional Constitution" upon which there is consensus-is
"chimerical," he wrote. 18 The Constitution is a "model instance" of
what philosophers label an "essentially contested concept" that will
be the subject of endless disputation. 19 What is more (and worse),
12. See Charles Fried, Editorial, Courting Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at
A29; see also Jonathan T. Molot, PrincipledMinimalism: Restriking the Balance Between
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1835 (2004) (arguing
that minimalism's emphasis on restricting judicial power downplays the importance of
legal principles).
13. See SUNSTEIN, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, supra note 2, at 61-72.
14. See MCINTYRE, supra note 5, at 253.
15.

SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).

16. Id. at 120-21.
17. Id. at 125.
18. Id. at 141.
19. Id. at 124 (citing WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

1358

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

"the very fact that the disputants believe that they are joined by
allegiance to a given concept may make the disputes more bitter than
those between recognized antagonists. Betrayal of ostensibly shared
visions almost always generates greater animosity than the opposition
of forthrightly identified opponents.""0 The Constitution "is as likely
to set the stage for disputation as to end it."21 All the same, Levinson
felt it right to lend his name to the Constitution in support of the
project it holds forth. It provides as good a discourse, as useful a
rhetorical system, as we have available for engaging in our
disputation over the political and social visions we believe best depict
the nation's past, present, and future.22 A "limited constitutional
faith"-a commitment to "a process of becoming and to taking
responsibility for constructing the political vision toward which I
strive, joined, I hope, with others"-is warranted.2 3
Affirming Levinson's hope in the "process of becoming,"
Jefferson Powell asserts that claims like McIntyre's that "American
constitutional law is empty at its center"2 4 are wrong because they
miss the yield of a "history of constitutional discussion" in this
country.
Powell identifies twenty propositions or themes that are
"common ground for contemporary constitutional debate."26 In his
own Words:
(1) No political or social dispute-none, not any, not ever-is
to be resolved by military means.27

10 (2d ed. 1983), and W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in THE IMPORTANCE
OF LANGUAGE 123 (Max Black, ed. 1962)).

20. Id. at 125.
21. Id. at 153-54.
22. Id. at 192.
23. Id. at 193. Levinson admitted to great difficulty in making this commitment given
the Constitution's pro-slavery provisions. He arrived at his profession of faith thanks to
the inspiration of Frederick Douglass, whose "ability to speak in the terms of the
Constitution-and to stretch the sense of constitutional possibility"-exemplified "the
possibilities present in the discourse." Id. at 192.
The calculation has changed for Levinson since he published ConstitutionalFaith
in 1988. The 2000 electoral controversy has highlighted for him certain intolerable

deficiencies in the document that so hinder democracy as to require rejection. See Sanford
Levinson, Why I Did Not Sign the Constitution: With a Chance to Endorse It, I Had to
Decline,
FINDLAW,
Sept.
23,
2003,
at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/comrnentary/20030923_levinson.html (on file with the North

Carolina Law Review).
24. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 205 (2002).
25. Id. at 203.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 205 (emphasis omitted).

ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION
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(2)
The electoral processes ordained for selecting the
president and members of Congress must be followed
regardless of circumstance or consequence. 28
(3) Each and every action of the federal government, its
branches, its components, its officers and its agents must be
authorized by the Constitution.29
(4) With exceptions relating to the federal government, the
state governments need not demonstrate that their actions are
authorized by the Constitution. °
(5) The federal government is not omnicompetent.31
(6) State governments and state officers must obey federal
rules of law and federal commands that are consistent with the
Constitution.32
(7) The exercise of constitutionally authorized (or permitted)
powers is subordinate to constitutional prohibitions and
guarantees of individual liberty: in short, constitutional rights
trump constitutional powers.33

(8) Some constitutional rights are absolute; some are not, and
their scope is defined in part with respect to social need.34
(9) As a matter of constitutional law, American executive
officers must obey judicial orders, at least once affirmed at the
highest level.35
(10) As a matter of constitutional morality, American
legislatures ought to respect settled judicial views about the
meaning of the Constitution, unless they undertake the task of

28. Id. (emphasis omitted). The principle is confirmed, Powell adds, by the 2000
electoral controversy, which never presented a "serious danger that the ultimate outcome
of the process would be set aside by military or other unconstitutional means." Id. at 238
n.3.
29. Id. at 205 (emphasis omitted). "This principle brings with it a necessary corollary:
There are no extraconstitutionalsources of federal power." Id.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 206 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 207 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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amending the Constitution.36
(11) The judiciary is not infallible; therefore, the people and
the political branches of the federal government ought to take
appropriate steps to change the constitutional views of the
judiciary, when they believe the courts have erred, through
constitutional amendment, litigation, and the appointments
process.37

(12) The Constitution assigns the resolution of some
constitutional questions to the political branches of the federal
government; therefore, the judiciary must abstain from
addressing these questions.38
(13) There are no (federal) extraconstitutional sources of
legal limitation on the political branches or the states;
therefore, a court exercising the power of judicial review under
federal law must invoke a rule of law ultimately derived from
the Constitution.39
(14) In constitutional argument it is legitimate to invoke text,
constitutional structure, original meaning, original intent,
judicial precedent and doctrine, political-branch practice and
doctrine, settled expectations, the ethos of American
constitutionalism, the traditions of our law and our people, and
the consequences of differing interpretations of the
Constitution. 4°
(15) The Constitution is a practical instrument of governance;
its grants of power and its guarantees of individual liberty are to
be construed, to the extent reasonably possible, to create a
coherent political system capable of achieving the goals stated
in its preamble.41
(16) The Congress is constitutionally authorized to regulate
42
the national economy.

36. Id. (emphasis omitted).
37. Id. (emphasis omitted).
38. Id. at 208 (emphasis omitted).
39. Id. (emphasis omitted).
40. Id. (emphasis omitted). The principle has two corollaries: "The Constitution does
not ordain a fixed set of legitimate forms of argument" and "[tihe Constitution does not
ordaina particularmoral orpolitical theory." Id. at 209.
41. Id. at 209 (emphasis omitted).
42. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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(17) American governments must respect an extremely broad
realm of free expression.43
(18) American governments must not compel religious orsave in fairly rare circumstances-political expression."
(19) American governments must not enforce or condone

racial caste.45

(20) American governments must obey judicially defined
they inflict (at least many forms of) injury on
processes when
46
individuals.
Powell's vision of the American constitutional center is a
pragmatic one. The values located there achieved their centrality not
because they are shared by all beyond all objection. Rather, they are
practical postulates that the large majority of disputants are willing
(often unconsciously) to accept as the framework for meaningful
contemporary engagement of constitutional disputes. This center of
principles emerged from a long history of constitutional debate in
courts and, critically and not to be overlooked, in politics. Its content
accordingly has changed and can change as new debates arise and
unfold:
[T]he principles that seem agreed upon at one point may always
be narrowed, transformed, or (infrequently) repudiated at a
later time. But the longer a principle is accepted, the more
difficult its repudiation, both because it becomes part of the
bedrock assumptions that all constitutionalists bring to the task,
and because the practical implications of repudiation become
extremely weighty.47
Powell is not alone in urging a picture of an American
constitutional center of shared values. Cass Sunstein identifies ten
basic substantive commitments that enjoy broad acceptance by
people otherwise divergent in their views on matters of politics and
the role of the courts. Sunstein's list is shorter than Powell's because
he sets aside structural considerations and confines his attention to

principles bearing directly on individual rights. The ten, in Sunstein's
words:
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 210 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 204.

1362

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

(1) Protection against unauthorized imprisonment....
(2) Protection of political dissent....
(3) The right to vote ....
(4) Religious liberty ....
(5) Protection against physical invasion of property....
(6) Protection against police abuse of person or property....
(7) The rule of law....
(a) Clear, general, publicly accessible rules of criminal law
laid down in advance....
(b) Prospectivity, no retroactivity....
(c) Official conformity to law; relationship between law on
the books and law in the world....
(d) Hearing rights and availability of review by independent
adjudicative officials....
(8) No torture, murder, or physical abuse by the government
(9) Protection against slavery or subordination on the basis of
race or sex....

(10) Substantive protection
of the human body against
48
government invasion.
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry likewise see a constitutional
center with substantive content. They point to eight "basic ideas and
principles of constitutional law ... that most Americans-including

most lawyers-would endorse."4 9 The list of eight, in Farber and
Sherry's words:
(1) The Constitution is a written document, drafted in 1787 and
48. See SUNSTEIN, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, supra note 2, at 64-67 (emphasis
omitted).
49. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 2 (2002).
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ratified in 1789, with important amendments soon thereafter
adding the Bill of Rights, and other important amendments
added in the wake of the Civil War (as well as at other times).
(2)
The Supreme Court is in charge of enforcing the
Constitution. Its job is to follow the law, not to bow to public
opinion or to implement the personal values of the justices. In
general, interpretation should begin with the meaning the
words conveyed to those who wrote and ratified the various
parts of it ("the framers" or "the founding generation").
(3) The Constitution can only be changed through the formal,
cumbersome process of amendment, specified in Article V.
(4) The Supreme Court's rulings are law, and must be followed
by other judges and government officials as well as by ordinary
citizens.
(5) Under the Constitution, the federal government has the
power to legislate on a broad range of subjects, including health
and the environment, workplace conditions and discrimination,
drugs, and organized crime.
(6)
It is unconstitutional for either the federal or state
governments to engage in racial segregation or to deliberately
discriminate against women or racial or ethnic minorities.
(7) The Constitution envisions states not merely as regional
offices of the federal government but as possessing their own
separate sovereignty. However, both states and the federal
government must respect freedom of speech, refrain from
unconstitutional searches, respect the right to remain silent, and
so forth.
(8) It would violate the Constitution-or so most people
assume-for the government to assign spouses to people or to
dictate their family size, to require them to get abortions, to
deprive them of custody of their children arbitrarily, or to force
them to submit to sterilization."
There are similarities as well as differences in these accounts
from Powell, Sunstein, and Farber and Sherry, both as to the content
identified as central and as to the operational significance of the

50. See id. at 2-3.
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principles so identified. For our purposes, what is important is what
the existence of these lists establishes. One can have more than
ample regard for the contestability of constitutional assertions, their
historical contingency, and their limited capacity to determine
conclusions-in short, one can be a cosmopolitan constitutional
lawyer, attuned to the postmodern-and nonetheless believe in and
articulate "a set of shared constitutional first principles."'" With time,
some of that set's content may come and some may go. Moreover,
the significance of that content for the resolution of today's
disputes-the question of application, of concept on the one hand and
conception on the other-can evoke disagreement and may be
complicated or subsumed by the social forces that fuel those disputes.
Yet it still remains sensible, meaningful, and useful to say that there is
a constitutional center with appreciable substantive content-a center
of common ground, of foundational precepts or propositions, of core
understandings that provide the gravitational force that holds our
polity together and permits us to disagree strongly but peacefully and
with the promise of resolution in accordance with principle.
On that score, I have a suspicion that the cosmopolitan
constitutional lawyer is, if anything, more grudging in the
acknowledgment of such a center than the average American.
Indeed, I would wager that it is precisely this conception of a set of
shared values-and not any set of ideas corresponding to minimalist
centrism-that would spring naturally to the mind of the average
American who heard us pose the question of what it means to talk of
the center in matters of constitutional law. If the average American
thinks that way, it is a reassuring validation that the constitutional
canon can both inform and reflect the public's conscience. Consider
that most canonical of twentieth century constitutional cases, Brown
v. Board of Education.52 As students of the Constitution know, there
are two Browns. One, the Brown II of 1955 whose fiftieth
anniversary will not be widely celebrated this year, responded to the
intractability of social conflict with temporalizing accommodations
made famous by the now epigrammatical phrase "all deliberate
speed."53 It is the lawyer's Brown, and a minimalist centrist's cut at
that. The other Brown, the Brown I of 1954, is the Brown that is
celebrated somewhere in the nation every day for having summoned
a core constitutional truth that ratiocinations had sought to obscure
51. See POWELL, supra note 24, at 205.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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The opinion itself may be an
since the nation's founding.
incompletely theorized agreement, but the case lives in the public eye
as a monument to our capacity to tap a constitutional center of core
values.
We now can appreciate better the uneasiness of minimalist
centrism's relationship with the idea of shared values. For those who
doubt the existence of shared values in our society, a jurisprudence of
accommodation and temporalizing, of maneuvers to finesse social
conflict with truce terms that give each side a measure of satisfaction,
is the logical terminus for the judicial centrist. Such a jurisprudence
also serves as the strategic percentage play for anyone who believes
there is a constitutional center of content but doubts the judiciary's
capacity to confidently and competently summon that center to
resolve conflicts. Those doubts, of course, have a considerable
pedigree. Long before indeterminacy became a household word in
constitutional' law and the contestability of truth claims became
second-nature, the thought that Justices could summon the center had
been undermined by generations of lawyers, jurists, and scholars.
From Thayer,54 to Bickel,5 5 to Ely,56 to Sunstein today,5 7 a root
skepticism of the judicial capacity to work directly with such stuff has
been a constant theme. Political leaders may be bold enough to
appeal directly to the center, but the judge who does so flirts too
openly with
unmitigated
countermajoritarianism
and the
impermissible assertion of subjective will. In the vernacular, the
judge who summons the center is begging to be taken to task for
activism, a quality that easily can be postulated as antithetical to
centrism once you have assumed that centrism means finding some
appeasing midpoint between clashing forces in a conflict. To be a
centrist Justice, it thus seems, you had best put any notion of a
constitutionalcenter out of your mind and focus your thoughts instead
on the business of quelling and abating strife. Any judicial relations
with a constitutional center of content must be indirect, mediated
54. See generally James B. Thayer, The Origins and Scope of the American Doctrineof
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893) (arguing that courts should exercise the
power of judicial review with great caution and intervene only in cases of clear error).
55. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d
ed. 1986) (arguing that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" presented by an unelected
judiciary is best countered by judges exhibiting the "passive virtues").
56. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing that
judicial review is best justified when limited to reinforcing democratic values).
57. See generally SUNSTEIN, JUDICIAL MINIMALISM, supra note 2 (urging judges to
avoid deciding cases based on broad principles and to leave as much open for democratic
decisionmaking as possible by resolving cases on narrow grounds).
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through legal doctrine and conventions of argument that reflect
longstanding cultural skepticism of the Court as a fully competent
steward of the Constitution in its full capacity."
III. SUMMONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CENTER: JUSTICE
KENNEDY'S GRAND CENTRISM

Justice Kennedy presents the alternative for those who believe in
a constitutional center of content, turning the skepticism away from
judges and directing it instead toward the consequences of a
jurisprudence that is reluctant to profess its faith in shared values.
Although there are instances when Justice Kennedy is drawn to the
ways of minimalist centrism,59 several of the moments for which
history will remember him best involve exercises of a different brand
of centrism altogether. I am speaking of his liberty-affirming
opinions in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas, 0 Planned Parenthoodv.
Casey,6 1 Romer v. Evans,62 Texas v. Johnson,63 Lee v. Weisman,64 and
Chavez v. Martinez.6 5 What makes these moments distinctive is
Justice Kennedy's treatment of them as occasions that demand a
direct, unmediated appeal to the constitutional center and the simple,
shared truths it contains. In Justice Kennedy's view, the center exists
and- must hold, but it cannot hold unless the expositions of
constitutional interpretation keep the ideal of the center plainly in
sight. The good constitutional steward therefore must be willing to
58. For a now-classic discussion of how doubts about the judicial role may inhibit
constitutional interpretations and leave constitutional content untapped, see Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). See also Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-34
(explaining that when the Supreme Court decides cases in a narrow fashion, it often
implicitly legitimates governmental action that the decisions themselves leave untouched).
59. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-95 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the law school's concept of "critical mass" is inconsistent with the
individual consideration necessary for a race-conscious law school admissions program to
survive strict scrutiny); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (limiting the
holding to the particular circumstances of the case on account of the "many complexities"
inherent in voting rights cases); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956-80 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of interfering too broadly with the state's
right to regulate abortion and favoring doctrinal devices that facilitate the assertion of the
state's interests).
60. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
61. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
62. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
63. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
64. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
65. 538 U.S. 760, 789-99 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

2005]

GRAND CENTRISM

1367

transcend the thick complexities and fine niceties of legal argument
when they threaten to obscure the People's vision of a clear
constitutional center or confound the accessibility of its content.
Judges are competent to summon the center and should do so with
confidence precisely because we need it to be so, because in our
constitutional culture as it has evolved it is a responsibility of
stewardship that none other than judges can be expected to discharge.
Let us call this "grand centrism." It deserves the centrist label
even though it is a far cry from the accommodating and temporalizing
we commonly associate with a judicial centrist these days. It is quite
literally centrist because it is fixated on-indeed, its ethos is-the
essentiality of a constitutional center with approachable content that
has long-run legitimating power and immediate justificatory power as
well. It insists that some social clashes can be resolved in the name of
shared values and must be resolved in that manner if the public is to
enjoy an enduring connection with and common commitment to the
Constitution. The unconventionality of its method does not rob the
approach of its centrist aspirations and quality; its different
orientation and style only make it "grand" as opposed to
"minimalist."
Minimalist centrism works a contextually and
temporally confined tableau; Kennedy's grand centrism broadens the
context and spans time. Minimalist centrism presses legal argument
to make space for the short-term defusing of controversy by
accommodation; Kennedy's grand centrism transcends doctrine to
seek resolution by and reaffirmation of simple, pure principles.
Minimalist centrism manufactures a midpoint of compromise;
enforces a center of values
Kennedy's grand centrism
uncompromisingly. Minimalist centrism sells its dispositions with
rhetoric to placate the disputants of the day and assure them that
their interests have not been dashed and that the Court has no side to
champion; Kennedy's grand centrism employs a rhetoric of
intergenerational responsibility and personal sacrifice to rally the
disputants to adhere to basic principles that the Court must maintain
for the benefit of all. Kennedy's centrism is grand for its aspiration,
its sweeping vision, its transcendence of legal discourse, and its highspirited rhetoric-which may mean that it is also grand because it is
audaciously ambitious.
Such is grand centrism by way of general introduction. Let us
look at it a bit more closely from two perspectives. Consider the logic
that structures it and the rhetoric that carries it into execution.
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The Logic of Grand Centrism

The starting point for understanding the logic of Justice
Kennedy's grand centrism can be found in his concurring opinion in
Texas v. Johnson,6 6 the flag burning decision. We live, he wrote, "in
an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple truths are burdened
by unneeded apologetics. ' 67 As the context makes clear, Justice
Kennedy does not regard this cultural observation as a cause for
celebration or resignation. It identifies a condition we must rise to
resist. There is nothing wrong with absolutes and simple truths by
Justice Kennedy's lights, nothing naive or embarrassing about
believing in them. What is to be rued is the weakness of spirit and
lost resolve that causes one to doubt their existence and value or to
saddle them with defensive annotations that undermine their clarity
and command.
When you think about it, Justice Kennedy is speaking of
challenges to faith-in Sanford Levinson's words, "[t]he crisis in a
faith system [that] occurs when there is no longer agreement on what
counts as a 'center,' 'essence,' or 'foundation' that must be preserved
at the necessary cost of sacrificing more peripheral values."'68 Faith in
simple shared values is made difficult by our times, but for Justice
Kennedy it remains viable. The American flag still "holds a lonely
place of honor"69 in an age like ours because it successfully symbolizes
commonly held principles; it is a "constant in expressing beliefs
Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which
sustains the human spirit."7 The Constitution enjoys a similar status
in Justice Kennedy's America. "[The] Constitution survives over
time," he wrote, "because the people share a common, historic
commitment to certain simple but fundamental principles which
The descriptive point leads to
preserve their freedom."7 1
prescriptions as well. Faith is not only viable, it is vital. The
Constitution contains "pure command[s]" at its core which its leading
interpreters, the Justices of the Supreme Court, must honor as
commands and maintain as pure. Simplicity in the articulation and

66. 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding that a ban on flag desecration violates the First
Amendment).
67. Id. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. LEVINSON, supra note 15, at 153.
69. Johnson,491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 794 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
72. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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application of those principles is essential to their popular
accessibility, which in turn is essential to their status as shared, all of
which in turn is essential to the Constitution's ability to fulfill for each
generation its "own promise, the promise of liberty."73 Those quoted
words about promise-authored by Justice Kennedy 74-come from
75
the conclusion of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,
and they were preceded by a concise proclamation of the role of a
living faith in the Constitution's project: "Our Constitution is a
covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us, and
then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each
generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms
embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than
76
one."
Popular belief in a constitutional center of shared ideas and
aspirations, carried from one generation to the next: that is the key
article of the constitutional faith that Justice Kennedy consistently
preaches in the cases that test liberty's meaning for our times. The
implications for judicial review are eye-opening for constitutionalists
schooled in the wary ways of restraint. As the ultimate expositors of
the Constitution, the Justices must be at least as wary of restraint's
ways, lest they let their lawyerly inclinations deprive them of their
standing as keepers of the faith and ministers to the faithful.
Legalistic qualifications and specifications can cloud the center and
disrupt the process of coherent succession by problematizing the
center's content, obscuring it from popular view, and undermining the
Court's capacity to inspire faith and engagement. That is why the
"powerful arguments" made on behalf of the criminalization of flag
burning had to be rejected in Texas v. Johnson77 and why the adroit
rejoinders of the dissenters in Lee v. Weisman78 had to be resisted as
well. "To compromise [a core] principle today," Justice Kennedy
warned in Lee, "is to deny our own tradition and forfeit our standing

73. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992)
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
74. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 215 (2005) (attributing the closing
sentences of Casey to Justice Kennedy).
75. 505 U.S. 833, 846, 876 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(preserving the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade and announcing that restrictions on
abortion are invalid only if they impose an "undue burden" on the right to choose).
76. Id. at 901 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (emphases added).
77. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
78. 505 U.S. 577, 632, 644-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court for ignoring the historical understandings of the
Establishment Clause).
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to urge others to secure the protections of that tradition for
themselves. ' 79 It also is why Bowers v. Hardwick" had to be purged
from the pages rather than distinguished on the equal protection
grounds that the minimalist Justice O'Connor thought sufficient to
tide things over.8 1 Hardwick defiled the simple ideal of liberty when it
employed the legal modes of due process analysis to credit "powerful
voices [that] condemn homosexual conduct as immoral;"8 2 it
subverted by sidestep the true claim of liberty in the case, which was
the asserted right of homosexual persons to enter private, intimate
relationships "and still retain their dignity as free persons."83 So long
as Hardwick remained precedent, even a precedent of lesser technical
import supposing the criminalization of sodomy were held
permissible only when formally imposed on heterosexuals and
homosexuals alike, its existence would continue to serve in the
American culture as an intolerable "invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and private spheres" that
"demeans the lives of homosexual persons."84
Preservation of the constitutional center in its pure simplicity
figured no less heavily in Justice Kennedy's explication and
reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade85 in Casey. Many people construe Roe's
survival as a testament to the draw of stare decisis and the special
institutional wages of overruling a controversial decision under fire
and after a change in the Court's membership.86 But if you reread
Justice Kennedy's contributions to the joint opinion in Casey in light
of these observations (Parts I and II of the joint opinion are Justice
Kennedy's product, as are the opinion's concluding sentences 87) you
79. Id. at 592.
80. 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (denying constitutional protection to the private
homosexual activity of consenting adults), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
81. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
82. Id. at 571 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.).
83. See id. at 567.
84. Id. at 575.
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Anthony Kennedy and the Jurisprudenceof Respectable
Conservatism, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 151-52

(Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (noting that the Court felt that "a total about-face on the
abortion issue would undermine public confidence in the Court by making it appear that
constitutional adjudication was based on. nothing more than ordinary political
considerations").
87. See JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT 163-64 (1995) (reporting on the Rehnquist Court's internal dynamics

and attributing Parts I and II of the join opinion in Casey to Justice Kennedy); see also
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should come away with a refined impression. He opened with words
now famous: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."88
It is the same call to faith Justice Kennedy voiced in Texas v. Johnson,
a call for trusted absolutes and simple truths unburdened by
unneeded apologetics. What followed was an effort to dispel doubt
by jettisoning the troubled argot of privacy and re-presenting a
woman's right to choose as a perfectly natural explication of the core
liberty protected by the Constitution that owes no apologies. A
woman's right to choose, Justice Kennedy explained, flows straight
from "the heart of liberty"-"the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." 89 It flows in a straight line that can be interrupted only by
demeaning a woman's independence and subordinating her to the
"compulsion of the State" 9 -an interruption that cannot be
entertained without ignoring the extraordinary degree to which that
compulsion would dictate "[t]he destiny of the woman" and override
"her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society."91
To impugn the method of argument in Lawrence and Casey for
its avoidance of legal doctrine, for its transcendence of rules and
standards and tests devised to constrain judges, for its boldness,9 2 is to
miss entirely its meaning within Justice Kennedy's faith system.
Articulations of constitutional liberty have to proceed this way if a
constitutional center with substantive content is to endure. To
circumscribe them with legal methods calculated to "curb[] the
discretion of federal judges" exalts judicial restraint but cheapens the
"promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter."93 In Justice Kennedy's grand
centrism, reasoning about and from that realm of personal liberty at
the constitutional center is driven by an imperative of clarity for the
TUSHNET, supra note 74, at 214-15 (same, and noting that the joint opinion's concluding

senteres are attributable to Justice Kennedy).
88. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
89. Id. at 851 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
90. Id. (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
91. Id. at 852 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
92. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence "reflects a

breakdown of the Court's most recent attempts to put doctrinal restraints on" substantive
due process); Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1060 (2004)

(expressing discomfort with Lawrence partly because of its "opacity[,] ... breadth and
ambition").
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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laity rather than satisfaction of the legal professionals.
That
imperative starts the reasoning and also provides the principles that
guide the reasoning through its intermediate steps. As Justice
Kennedy practices it, reasoning from the center of shared values
involves the application of what amounts to a "non-distortion"
principle. Will denying a claim of liberty cloud the center with
qualifications and limitations that reflect qualms about institutional
roles rather than the purity of the liberty principle itself? If so, then
one must be skeptical of the argument for limitation, as its acceptance
(in fine and in gross) eventually will distort the center, rendering it
inaccessible to the People who must fulfill their covenant of coherent
succession.9 4 Will denying the claim of liberty yield a picture of
unequally distributed freedom, of markedly disproportionate burdens
on liberty, which suggests bias has infected our rendering of the
center? If so, then one must again be skeptical of the argument for
limitation, and for the same reasons. 5 Will denying the claim of
liberty privilege the competing interests of others that boil down to a
difference of opinion about morality and its dictates? If so, then once
again one must be skeptical of the argument for limitation.9 6
Protected liberty must remain clear of obfuscation, accessible to all
without favor, and free from the contingencies of political will and
majoritarian assertions of moral differences. It is thus that a center of
content remains approachable so that "persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom."' It
94. See, e.g., id. at 850-51 (counseling against allowing the state to definitively resolve
the philosophical issues raised by abortion because liberty requires that women retain the
right to choose); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-35 (1996) (concluding that
state referendum was not intended to further legislative ends but in fact was intended to
make homosexuals "unequal to everyone else," and stressing that the rarity of laws that
single out a certain class for disfavor demonstrates the centrality of the equal protection
principle in American society).
95. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in part because "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres").
96. See, e.g., id. at 571 (acknowledging "powerful voices [that] condemn homosexual
conduct as immoral," but asserting that those forces may not use "the power of the State
to enforce those views on the whole of society through the criminal law"); Casey, 505 U.S.
at 850 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("Some of us as individuals find
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our
decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code."); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(acknowledging the "enormity of the offense" of flag-burning, but concluding that such
acts of speech are constitutionally protected).
97. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579; see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 794 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It damages the law, and the
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is thus that Justices retain their standing to urge its observance and
enjoyment.
B.

Grand Centrism's Rhetoric

Justice Kennedy's grand centrism hinges on the criticality of
popular faith in a constitutional center. Its reasoning, structured
around an imperative of clarity for the laity, serves a project of faith
inculcation and maintenance. The project also is aided by distinctive
rhetoric that deserves a few words here as well.
Some centrist rhetoric, probably the most common in
contemporary constitutional discourse, operates to position the
speaker and his or her view somewhere between two approaches that
are represented as the chief alternatives having currency at the
moment and each of which is marginalized as untenably extreme.
Supreme Court Justices employ it often. The undue burden standard
was installed into today's abortion jurisprudence with plenty of
rhetorical accompaniment to that effect, for instance,98 and Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor routinely use such rhetoric to present
their positions on questions of national power and substantive due
process as moderate because they avoid the excesses of those to the
left and to the right of them on the Court. 99 Constitutional law
scholars employ the rhetoric too. Mark Tushnet, for example, noted
the prevalence of such rhetorical moves in Cass Sunstein's The Partial
Constitution.1" Grand centrism's supporting rhetoric differs. It
makes no effort to promote grand centrism as a moderating
compromise and does not purport to reach results that afford each
side a measure of immediate satisfaction. It actually underscores the
sacrifice that the losing side is making, holding it up as righteous and
worthy of emulation. It ennobles personal sacrifice today as the
fulfillment of our generation's debt to our heirs and our forebears
vocabulary with which we impart our legal tradition from one generation to the next, to
downgrade our understanding of what the Fifth Amendment requires.").
98. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-79 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
Indeed, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg laments a betrayal of that rhetoric's
promise. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956-60 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573-80 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (assuring readers that respect for stare decisis will limit the full potential
impact of the majority's decision but criticizing the more liberal approach as favoring the
national government too heavily); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (joined by Kennedy, J.) (disavowing as overly strict
Justice Scalia's approach to substantive due process, but affirming that some specificity is
required in defining the rights at issue).
100. See Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 10981103 (1993) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)).
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alike.
In a move that might strike some observers as uncomfortably
confessional, Justice Kennedy brings the Supreme Court Justice into
the foreground as a fellow citizen who often shares the pain because
he or she, too, has deeply held preferences that lose out, and whose
sacrifice in service of the process of coherent succession is an act of
faith (or, if you will, of civic virtue) that sets an example. Upholding
the constitutional center "exacts its personal toll" on a judge, Justice
Kennedy reminds us in Texas v. Johnson.' Justices often suffer in
silence, but that should not be taken as evidence of unmitigated
satisfaction, let alone an indication of any pleasure whatsoever in the
direct consequences of the decision at hand. As Justice Kennedy
explained in Johnson, "so great is our commitment to th[e] process
that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for
the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that
dictates the decision."" °2
Yet distaste there is and, notwithstanding the foregoing
disclaimer, Justice Kennedy really must want it noted because he
alludes to it frequently.
In Johnson, he proceeded to label
desecration of the American flag "repellent" and spoke dismissively
of the desecrator as a person who might "not even possess the ability
to.. . appreciate the enormity of the offense he gave."' 3 In Casey, he
stressed that "[m]en and women of good conscience can disagree, and
we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral
and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its
earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our
most basic principles of morality." 1" In Lawrence, he emphasized
that some persons "condemn homosexual conduct as immoral," a
view which for its holders reflects "not trivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their
lives." 05 The point of these passages goes beyond mere cathartic
hand-wringing, or the elicitation of sympathy for the judge's thankless
task, or a token recognition of the interests of the losing disputants.
Their rhetorical effect is to turn the depth of commitment to such
views and the hardship of foregoing them into an emblem of the
101. 491 U.S. at 420 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
105. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
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constitutional center's reality and essentiality. The center and its
worth are not easy to bring home to those of us who live in the here
and now. Core shared values pay most of their dividends over the
long haul and to society as a whole; for persons who are reasonably
well-served by majoritarian politics, the benefits are experienced as a
stable and relatively unthreatening background environment that is
easily taken for granted. 10 6 The pronounced sacrifices one must make
for the center in cases like Johnson, Casey, and Lawrence, on the
other hand, provide an immediate and gripping illustration of the
center's gravity. That Justices-and following their lead, citizensare able to yield such heartfelt and weighty interests speaks to the
depth of their faith in the process of coherent constitutional
succession that ensures "persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom."'1 7 The more
"painful th[e] judgment is to announce," the more it merits
remembrance as a "recognition of the costs to which those beliefs
commit us."'" 8
One can doubt that the rhetoric does much to assuage the more
committed disputants who feel the sacrifice most acutely. As opinion
polls show, however, the sharp polarization we see in special-interest
advocacy and much of electoral politics does not necessarily mirror
the citizenry at large. There is a sizeable center out there of people
whose views on such contentious questions are not so firmly fixed and
who will register different and varying preferences when the
questions are rephrased to broaden (or narrow) the considerations at
stake. 09 It is particularly to that audience, the popular colloquial
center, that grand centrism seems to be pitching the attractions of
faith in a constitutional center. Whether a Supreme Court Justice can
reasonably hope to have his words reach any appreciable number in
that vast audience is a fair question; it is a stretch to think that his
106. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1996) (noting that the benefits
afforded by the principle of equal protection are enjoyed unconsciously and taken for
granted by most persons). In noting the deep-background effect of shared values, we
should not overlook the immense significance that a decision affirming shared values can
have for persons living in the here and now. One need only recall the moving celebrations
that met Lawrence v. Texas to appreciate the capacity of such a decision to liberate the
spirit and kindle feelings of patriotism and community.
107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
108. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. For instance, one of the most comprehensive studies of death penalty attitudes to
date demonstrates that public support for the death penalty drops precipitously when
alternative punishments such as life imprisonment without the possibility of parole are
available. See RICHARD C. DIETER, SENTENCING FOR LIFE:
ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY (1993).
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words directly reach many such persons even with the assistance of
the New York Times, which publishes opinions in blockbuster cases
like Casey and Lawrence. Yet it may well be a matter of little
consequence for a grand centrist who has posited that the public's
relationship to a substantive center of constitutional values can exist,
must exist, and to be fostered must be treated as if it does exist. The
rhetorical tools may be limited, but you use what you have.
IV. CENTRISM IN THE ABSENCE OF SHARED VALUES: JUSTICE
KENNEDY'S CONCEPTUAL MODERATION

Does Justice Kennedy's grand centrism extend beyond his liberty
jurisprudence to the realm of federalism, national power, and the
Constitution's grand structural scheme or plan? The answer is no, but
the question is profitably asked because it leads us to see how the
Justice uses more than one brand of centrism to construct a
distinctive centrist personam.
Justice Kennedy's approach in the federalism and national power
areas is founded upon a centrist image. He invokes the vision of a
center of core constitutional ideas, memorably captured in the
metaphorical "atom of sovereignty" he depicted in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton.110 The "genius" of the Framers, Justice Kennedy
went on to explain there, was to split the atom and create "a legal
system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it
and are governed by it." '' The split atom, then, is not to be confused
with a shattered atom. To judge from Justice Kennedy's recitation in
Thornton and in subsequent cases,112 the Founders left us with a
particle that is rather like the yin and the yang-principles that point
to multiple political identities and relationships that harmoniously
coexist and cohere to form a uniquely American essence.
While this certainly gestures toward something centrist, it differs
from the grand centrism we just encountered. The key article of
faith-popular belief in a constitutional center of shared ideas and
aspirations-is missing here. The structural precepts that Justice
Kennedy identifies serve freedom and foster popular self-

110. 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-15; City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516-17 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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government, but their centrality is unrelated to that. It is dictated

instead by sheer force of privileged legal credentials-the
Constitution's text, the understanding of the Framers, and the
authoritative interpretations of judges through the years" 3-rather
than any genuine or hypothesized popular adherence. 14 Justice

Kennedy's grand centrism is a civic affair that imagines popular
involvement in a process of constitutional development, which bonds
us to the center and to one another. His federalism and national

power jurisprudence is principally a top-down legal regulatory
It is the business of enforcing
enterprise for inside players.
against political actors
historically contingent structural principles
15
who overreach their bounds expediently.
If this were the extent of it, calling this dimension of Justice

Kennedy's jurisprudence centrist would push the label beyond any
usefulness. The mere insistence that a view is fundamental does not
suffice to make the position centrist. Every fervently held view would

qualify, including the countless number that no one would regard as
centrist in any helpful sense of the word. Nor should an earnest claim
that a view best squares with the text and original understanding be
enough to make a position centrist. Even if correct, such a claim is no
more centrist than textualism and originalism are centrist. Those
schools of interpretation have power and command and can even pass

as neutral in some circles of judgment.

Those are impressive

qualities, nice to have and certainly germane to the task of judicial
But a claim to legal
interpretation of the Constitution.

authoritativeness is not the same thing as an expression of some
centrist quality. The nation's once tenacious legal commitment to
slavery is a case in point.
113. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("[A]s the Constitution's structure, and its history,
and the authoritative interpretations of this Court make clear, the States' immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the states enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today .... ).
114. Justice Kennedy can wax reverentially about the Constitution's grand scheme or
design, as his dissertations in Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring),
Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-15, Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36, and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574-77
(Kennedy, J., concurring), demonstrate. But it is the reverence of the dutiful lawyer for
the rules he must obey, delivered with no expectation that it will inspire faith and sacrifice.
115. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783 (striking down a state constitutional amendment
that imposed term-limits on the state's congressional representatives as "inconsistent with
the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature"); Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding
that Congress may not "subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state
courts"); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 (limiting Congress's section 5 power and invalidating the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to the states as exceeding that power);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (holding for the first time in nearly sixty years that an act of general
application exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
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In the case of minimalist centrism, the centrist quality derives
from the ambition to avert a direct engagement with conflict in the
particular case or to fashion a compromise that gets us past today and
on to tomorrow. The jurisprudence's centrism is positional at the
case-specific level, manifested by an accommodationist posture
toward the social conflict at issue. In the case of grand centrism, the
centrist quality derives from the ambition to ascertain and maintain
substantive values that are widely shared. The jurisprudence's
centrism is manifested by its alignment with a popular
intergenerational mainstream of committed beliefs. In the case of
Justice Kennedy's federalism and national powers jurisprudence, it
turns out that there is a discernible centrist quality as well. It derives
from the ambition to be perceived as the solidly grounded and
moderate conceptual alternative to the extreme frameworks
represented by other positions on the Court and in contemporary
constitutional culture. The jurisprudence's centrism is positional, but
unlike minimalist centrism it operates at the conceptual level rather
than the case-specific level. Centrism is manifested here by the
fashioning of a moderate framework of harmonized principles that
disavows the extremes of unbridled nationalism and state-sovereignty
foundationalism alike.
We can call this iteration of centrism "conceptual moderation."
Justice Kennedy establishes that centrist quality by grounding his
approach to national power and state sovereignty with the holistic
metaphor of the split atom and then contrasting it with the more onesided and less balanced views he assigns to others. In Thornton,
accordingly, Justice Kennedy criticizes his more state-sovereignty
minded colleagues for extreme views that "disparage the republican
'
In Alden, it is his more
character of the National Government."1 16
nationalist minded colleagues who are taken to task for views that
equivalently "disparage ... what the Framers and those who ratified
the Constitution sought to accomplish when they created a federal
'
system."117
The centrist, we are left to infer, disparages nothing. It is
all about balance in vision, in outlook, in conceptualization, Justice
Kennedy stresses in Lopez1 8-a balance that is jeopardized by
political actors who expediently succumb to pressures from both
directions and by extremist tendencies on the Court that cater too
strongly to one or the other side of the scale.

116. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838.
117. Alden, 527 U.S. at 758.
118. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION: GRAND CENTRISM AND CONCEPTUAL MODERATION
JOINED-A CENTRIST PERSONAM

We could say that Justice Kennedy is a switch-hitting centrist.
When shared faith cannot serve as the centering force, a more
palatable, metaphorically centered and grounded framework that
avoids the extremes of the competition does. (Given his ability to
produce rulings that please conservatives one day and liberals the
next, we also could say that Justice Kennedy can hit the ball to all
fields.) It should interest us that an intelligent man who obviously has
devoted much thought to these matters has chosen to invoke both of
these brands of centrism to stake his ground in the areas that have
proved most controversial during his years on the Supreme Court.
Justice Kennedy plainly perceives himself as a centrist and wishes to
be perceived as one. These are the ways he has chosen to construct a
centrist judicial personam.
The coherence of that personam, to my mind, is best fathomed
by appreciating the ways it engages contemporary constitutional and
political culture. Note first how Justice Kennedy's two centrist tacks
combine to yield a jurisprudence that is centrist in the politically
immediate sense of the word. It is constitutional law's manifestation
of the position occupied by the Republican "Mods" that Thomas
Frank portrays in What's the Matter with Kansas?:
How
Conservatives Won the Heart of America,'19 a jaunty, left-leaning,
journalistic rumination on America in these days of red states and
blue states. The Mods, Frank argues, are the center in the ongoing
class war that infuses American politics. Paradoxically, this class war
denies the economic basis of social class and installs notions of
cultural authenticity in its stead, leaving the battles to be waged
between caricatured plain-spoken, God-respecting conservatives in
the heartland who proclaim to be under the cultural siege of snobbish,
effete, leftist elites in the coastal metropolises. As these battles roil,
the Mods-with views that fall between and straddle the two
caricatured camps-quietly profit while avoiding the front lines.
Economically conservative corporate types, the Mods are skeptical of
regulation and the capabilities and motives of an overfed federal
government. On social issues, however, they are considerably more
liberal than their conservative GOP compatriots-tolerant on
abortion, gay rights, and matters of race; moderately separationist on

119. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?:
WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004).

How

CONSERVATIVES
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church-and-state issues. 120 There is much for the Mods to like in
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. In his centrist personam, they can
see a constitutional reflection of themselves.
Taking a longer view from somewhat higher ground, Justice
Kennedy's centrist personam also gains strength by successfully
engaging both of the two principal national narratives that vie for
preeminence in our constitutional culture. One of those narratives,
Lincolnian in spirit, depicts a progressive American journey to perfect
individual freedom.121 The other narrative depicts an America that
returns whenever it can to a deeply rooted conservatism that distrusts
government generally and national power particularly.122 By holding
out the promise of synthesizing those narratives-indeed, by stepping
forward as the personification of such a synthesis-Justice Kennedy's
centrist personam associates itself with a deeper cultural mainstream
where strong and often conflicting currents manage to converge.
When we close back in and view Justice Kennedy's centrist
personam from the tighter confines of juriscentric traditions of
constitutional law, however, we can expect to hear some stiff
objections. How elitist, some might say, for a jurist to cast himself as
high priest. How brazen to resist lessons about judicial restraint that
generations of scholarship and judicial insight have yielded. How
alien to the norms of judicial interpretation of the Constitution to
deemphasize doctrine and place analysis on a plane that reasons
about shared values, their preservation, and their transmission. How
can this be centrism?
The foregoing objections beg questions straight down the line.
Justice Kennedy's choice to base his liberty jurisprudence on a vision
of shared values seems no more elitist or subjective than another
jurist's choice to side with originalism or intratextualism or the
elaboration of the constitutional precedents of other jurists; indeed, it
might be said to be less elitist for seeking to wrest interpretation from
the exclusive clutches of legal argument and augment it with more
popularly accessible discourse. Whether operating as a grand centrist
in a liberty case or a conceptual moderate in a case about federalism
120. See id. at 102-09, 127-28.
121. For a representative recent rendition, see
ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY:

generally

RICHARD RORTY,

LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA

(1998). For a recognition of the Lincolnian nature of this vision of the "thin Constitution,"
see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 11-12

(1999).
122. For a representative recent rendition, see generally H.W. BRANDS, THE STRANGE
DEATH OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2001).
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or national power, Justice Kennedy certainly frees himself from the
strictures of the tenets of judicial restraint and the interpretive
postulates that seek to implement them. But that shows only that he
has activist inclinations when judged by the standards of restraint. It
says nothing that detracts from the judicial quality of his
jurisprudence unless craft is wedded to restraint, a polemical claim
that has been answered by many others many times.'23 It also says
nothing that detracts from the centrist quality of his jurisprudence
unless centrism is wedded to restraint. As our examination of Justice
Kennedy's jurisprudence suggests, nothing dictates the necessity of
Efforts to insist on one might rightly be set aside as
such an equation.
124
polemical too.
In the final analysis, however, it is the conception of authority
and responsibility underlying Justice Kennedy's centrist personam
that provides his real answer to these objections. Although the
Constitution is of, by, and for the People, history has placed Supreme
Court Justices in a position of exceptional influence over its meaning.
Their utterances (and their silences) significantly shape constitutional
understandings, hopes, fears, and possibilities. The views of others,
meanwhile, are of comparatively limited practical significance to the
People, who have come to place primacy on the Court and its view.
Alternative assignments of authority and
That is how it is.
responsibility might be contemplated but they reside, for now, in the
realm of argued possibilities.'25 If you see merit in the ideal of
coherent succession, in the project of carrying on in the hope of
shared values, what would you ask of a Supreme Court Justice who is
stationed pivotally in the system of meaning-transmission? Were a
political leader to summon the center in precisely the same way as
123. For one example, see generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991).

124. That Justice Kennedy's centrism might abrade a lawyer's sensibilities far more
than a nonlawyer's makes a certain sense, for his liberty jurisprudence is as popularly
conceptualized a project as one can find on the Supreme Court these days. It makes for
irony as well. The Rehnquist Court has a reputation for its predilections toward judicial
supremacy. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
241 (2002) (arguing that the Court "ignores the existence of political questions" in its
quest for supremacy and fails to defer to elected representative bodies for similar reasons).
Justice Kennedy, the author of the assertively supremacist Boerne decision, especially
enjoys such a reputation.
POPULAR
125. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5-8 (2004) (arguing

that the task of

constitutional interpretation should fall more to the people); TUSHNET, supra note 121, at
177-94 (arguing for a "populist" constitutionalism that shifts interpretive power from the
courts to the people).
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Justice Kennedy, using the logic and rhetoric of grand centrism, might
we not hail her as a constitutional luminary with an admirable
appreciation of the bonds that can be formed between the People and
their Constitution through the assertion of shared values in our time
and across time-a champion of the center? If in fact we would, why
withhold the compliment from someone whose very job, under
prevailing cultural understandings, is to provide a constitutional
stewardship that very few others in the country can be expected to
supply?
In answering that question, we do well to keep William Butler
Yeats's words from The Second Coming in mind. In a world where
lack all conviction,
the center fails to hold, Yeats warned," [t]he best
' 126
intensity.
passionate
of
full
are
worst
while the

126. W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS
184-85 (18th ed. 1972).

